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ABSTRACT
Consideration of the Spacecraft System as an entity is the most
significant aspect of system engineering as applied to the design of
planetary spacecraft The system design activity discussed in this
Report is limited to those considerations involved with the establish-
ment of the required Spacecraft System capability, the development
of the design concept, and the generation of the subsystem functional
capability requirements.
I. INTRODUCTION
System engineering can be described as an engineering
approach to a problem whose solution requires considera-
tion of multiple technical disciplines This is immediately
recognized as a description that typifies most engineering
design activities To limit the term system engineering it is
necessary to first define what is meant by system Some
reflection reveals that a defined system is very likely a
subsystem of a larger system Thus, in discussions involv-
ing the term system engineering one acknowledges that
he is dealing with a specialized definition of the term
system
This Report emphasizes the design activities of defini-
tion and coordination of the interaction between elements
(subsystems) of the total spacecraft system The key
words here are total spacecraft, and the key concept
of system engineering as it pertains to spacecraft design
is the consideration of the design of the total spacecraft
Spacecraft System engineering demands an understand-
ing and appreciation of each subsystem's interaction with
other elements of the system, and also the system's inter-
action with other elements of the project, namely the
Launch Vehicle and Mission Operations Systems In sum-
mary, system engineering is the coordination of the
activities of specialists in subsystem areas to achieve an
optimum total design
The system engineering concept of viewing the entire
design as an entity to perform certain functions in an
integrated fashion is a vital consideration in the design
of spacecraft systems To achieve a reasonable, workable
system it is mandatory to utilize this system engineering
approach at1 the earliest possible time—as soon after
project inception as is practical, because many complexi-
ties of a spacecraft design become evident only when the
necessity arises to identify subsystem interactions that are
needed to achieve a specific result Spacecraft System
engineering was an integral part of the Manner Mars 1964
Project from its inception, and the success of this effort is
history History also shows that the lack of system engi-
neering considerations in spacecraft design has resulted
in unsuccessful projects
It is popular to speak of the principle of maximizing
the expected value when discussing the optimization of a
system In Spacecraft System engineering activities this
principle is essentially rewritten minimization of the
undesired quantity, mission failure This distinction is
important because at the present time the data available
are inadequate to permit any realistic quantitative assess-
ment of the probability of mission success The numerical
values associated with each quantitative analysis are not
of primary interest to the system engineer, his goal is to
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know that, within the myriad of constraints he must con-
sider, he has pursued every means of minimizing failure
At this point the term mission must be defined Through-
out this Report mission means all spacecraft with the same
assignment which are launched in a given planetary
opportunity
Considerable emphasis is placed on applying good
engineering judgment in determining how best to increase
system reliability A means of achieving this is through
a technique called failure mode effect analysis, described
by Casam in Ref 1 This technique permits examination
of critical functions in a spacecraft design and develops
appropriate system logic and redundancy to provide a
reasonable level of reliability
This Report will discuss some considerations of concern
to the system engineer in his effort to achieve a flight-
worthy spacecraft design No attempt is made to identify
those techniques used in defining, coordinating, and veri-
fying the design The Manner Mars 1964 spacecraft design
activity provides the basis for those examples given
II. SYSTEM ENGINEERING AS APPLIED TO THE SPACECRAFT DESIGN
The most significant aspect of system engineering as
applied to the design of planetary spacecraft is the con-
sideration of the spacecraft as a whole—an entity—which
involves the interactions between the subsystems of the
spacecraft and those between the Spacecraft System and
some comparable system such as the Launch Vehicle or
the Mission Operations Systems A key consideration, the
common denominator in many of the Spacecraft System
and subsystem interactions, is the flight path followed
from Earth to the distant planet This mission parameter
constrains and is constrained by the spacecraft design
Because system engineering involves various mission
trade-offs, the system engineer—who in this case is the
system designer—must necessarily examine all the space-
craft interactions to be in an advantageous position for
making the requisite decisions
Again, the system designer's responsibilities dictate that
he examine the total spacecraft—there is no other way
he can fulfill his assignment In addition to the trade-off
decision just mentioned, he must help determine the re-
quirements which the design must satisfy to achieve mis-
sion success, evolve the design concept and philosophy,
define required subsystem functional capabilities, review
and control interactions between subsystems, establish
the degree of complexity for each subsystem, generate
design restraints to guide spacecraft design activities,
determine functional and block redundancy requirements,
provide alternative operating mode capability for use in
mission operations, assure capability of spacecraft testing
in anticipated environments, and verify that the design is
capable of performing the mission
A. Required Spacecraft System Capability
Before any design activity can be initiated, the space-
craft requirements must be understood It is the system
designer's responsibility to determine what these require-
ments are, on the basis of the mission objectives outlined
in the Project Office Faced with the problem of design-
ing a spacecraft to go to Mars, the system designer is
forced to consider all reasonable means of achieving the
optimum design He identifies the primary tasks which
must be accomplished and limits the design to that which
is necessary for successfully satisfying the mission objec-
tives
One feature of the required system capabilities is that
these are not evolved in series with the mission objectives
In theory, the mission objectives precede the system re-
quirements, but, in practice, to establish achievable mis-
sion objectives, the system designer must conduct studies
to determine what mission possibilities exist This form of
feedback is typical of much of the design activity the
various phases may be shown in sequential fashion on
paper but the actual practice is to review later phases of
the project and provide feedback to permit reasonable
accomplishment of the preceding sequential steps (Fig 1)
In judging what needs to be achieved by the spacecraft,
the system designer must be certain that his understand-
ing of the requirements of the mission objectives is con-
sistent with the wishes of the Project Management As the
possible design approaches are considered, the situation
will arise where one design aproach might achieve the
required objectives, but at the expense of some other
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Fig. 1. System design activities
objective. The question may then arise about which objec-
tive is most important and on what basis this decision (and
subsequent decisions) should be made To facilitate this
decision-making process, the Project Office publishes the
list of mission objectives on a priority basis, and a list of
competitive design characteristics. Armed with these two
priority lists, the system designer is better able to make
the inevitable design decisions and compromises To illus-
trate the difference between the lists, the Manner 1964
mission objectives and competing characteristics are
shown below
1. Mariner Mars 1964 Mission Objectives
1. The primary obj'ective of the Manner Mars project
is to conduct close-up (flyby) scientific observations
of the planet Mars during the 1964-1965 opportunity
and to transmit the results of these observations back
to Earth
2 A secondary objective is to provide experience in
and knowledge of the performance of the basic en-
gineering equipment of an attitude-stabilized flyby
spacecraft during a long-duration flight in space
farther away from the Sun than the Earth
3 An additional secondary objective is to perform cer-
tain field or particle measurements, or both, in
interplanetary space during the trip to and in the
vicinity of Mars
4 A tertiary objective is to provide a design compatible
with a repetition of the flyby mission to Mars, or
provision of a mission with minimum modifications,
for the 1966-1967 Mars opportunity
2. Mariner Mars 1964 Competing Characteristics
1. Arrival at the planet within the prescribed accuracy
and capability to communicate telemetry during the
encounter period and for one week thereafter This
total function requires the following specific func-
tions
a Continuous proper Sun-line attitude orientation
b Continuous proper temperature control
c. Proper functioning of the solar power equipment
d Proper roll attitude control dunng and for one
week after encounter
e Proper operation of the communication equipment
during and for one week after encounter
f Proper operation of the midcourse maneuver
2 Proper operations of the planetary instruments and
the capability of these instruments to observe the
planet during the encounter mode
3 Proper operation of the science data storage and
handling equipment
4 Telemetry communication capability during the
transit phase, this function requires roll attitude
control when the high gam antenna is required
5 Adequate operation of the interplanetary science
equipment
6 Operation of the planetary scan in the desired fashion
7. Compatibility of the design with later mission re-
quirements
Another valuable contribution of the Project Office to
this decision-making process of the design effort is the
JPL TECHNICAL REPORT NO. 32-96O.
publication of mission worth statements in which quanti-
tative values are placed on a variety of achievements that
provide some mission return These values permit a
quantitative analysis of the mission from the standpoint
of reliability and mission return They also provide an
additional basis for future design decision
Other factors in the decision-making process are budget,
schedule, reliability, and state-of-the-art.
From the initial stages of the design process, the system
designer must consider the entire spacecraft design and
make decisions concerning the achievement of the mission
objectives Such early consideration of the spacecraft de-
sign concept is required to permit the Project Office to
publish the design criteria that will be followed during
the spacecraft design activity These criteria establish the
design approach to be taken, the reliability considerations
to be observed, and the schedule and weight constraints
to be met Here again is an example of feedback in which
a later phase of the design-process affects the spacecraft
design requirements
B. Deve/opmenf of the Design Concept
The development of the design concept is an intermedi-
ate step in the design process between the definition of
the mission objectives and design criteria by the Project
Office, and the establishment of requirements on the re-
spective spacecraft subsystems by the system designer
The objective is to identify what must be accomplished
and establish the means of satisfying these requirements
The establishing of the design concept for optimal
achievement of mission objectives is one of the prime
functions of the system designer He chooses, from all the
alternatives, the specific design approach which best fits
the mission objectives
Design concepts must be chosen which allow primary
mission objective achievement with the least risk to the
mission, and at the same time consider budget and proba-
bility of schedule accomplishment, by limiting the design
to necessary functions and implementing them in the least
complicated manner The primary spacecraft capability
required is that of communicating scientific data to Earth
In support of this requirement there must be a radio, a
telemetry system, a power system, and some scientific
instruments At JPL we augmented this complement with
an attitude control system, an on-board sequencer, a com-
mand receiving system and a propulsion system It is
readily recognized that these functions and their basic
relationships are generally repetitions from mission to
mission This concept of a standard spacecraft often per-
mits the use of existing designs and hardware, and tends
to diminish the risk to the mission. This concept also has
the advantage of some saving in cost.
The implementation of specific mission objectives re-
quires that special functions be integrated with the stan-
dard functions These special functions are often dictated
by the nature of the experiments during the transit phase
and those in the vicinity of the planet Successful design
concept development depends upon the ability of the sys-
tem designer to establish the requirements for special
functional capabilities This can be done only after the
spacecraft is examined as a whole to assure that all func-
tional interactions are recognized and carefully consid-
ered against the mission objectives, design critena, and
competing characteristics, as published by the Project
Office
As was mentioned, the development of mission objec-
tives depends upon the feedback provided by looking at
the design concept under consideration to see what looks
feasible. When we state that the functional interactions
must be considered against the mission objectives, we
acknowledge that the Spacecraft System design functions
as a continuing, iterative procedure Only where the itera-
tions do not uncover any additional design conflicts can the
system design approach be established To achieve this
status of no unresolved design conflicts, even at this gross
level, some reasonably detailed examinations of the re-
spective interface areas must be accomplished These
examinations are really part of a later design phase, note
that feedback plays a critical role here in the development
of the design concept
The first philosophy basic to the concepts chosen at
JPL for planetary spacecraft is that a spacecraft must be
capable of operating entirely without assistance from
Earth, except in the case of a postinjection propulsive tra-
jectory correction To allow the entire mission to be
accomplished without ground commands, a sequence
must be preprogrammed into the spacecraft The trajec-
tory correction is an exception because there is no way
to preprogram this maneuver This automatic spacecraft
concept does require that there be sufficient spacecraft
operating modes to accommodate those conditions which
are expected dunng the mission Since the data require-
ments differ dunng various mission phases, the spacecraft
must be capable of altering its mode of operation
A second design philosophy influencing the ultimate
design concept is that of providing at least two indepen-
dent means of initiating critical, discrete functions The
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interrelationships chosen between subsystems" must re-
flect this philosophy Although the use of radio commands
is the primary means of providing the second of the dis-
crete events should the automatic sequencing fail, other
techniques are used effectively. A complete description
of the Mariner IV design features implementing this phi-
losophy is given in Ref. 2.
A third design philosophy recognized as being critical
to planetary spacecraft design is that all critical continu-
ous functions be supported by redundant or alternate
modes An example of this is the redundant analog-to-
digital converter that was incorporated in the engineer-
ing telemetry subsystem of Manner TV This redundant
capability was attainable by ground command
C. Required Functional Capabilities
The completed spacecraft design must reflect certain
functional capabilities Thus specific functional capabili-
ties are required from each spacecraft subsystem to pro-
vide this overall system capability Subsystems are
identified on the basis of unique functional capabilities
grouped under the cognizance of a single organization
The identification of these functional capabilities on the
subsystem and system levels represents the intermediate
step between the development of the design concept and
the detailed hardware design phases of the system design
activity
Successful translation of the design concept into spe-
cific functional requirements to guide hardware design
requires that the spacecraft be examined as an entity to
assure that recognized problems will be considered from
all aspects and that the greatest likelihood exists of un-
covering new problems Also associated with this overall
examination is the fact that later mission phases must be
considered at this time when specific requirements of
these phases can be accommodated by the spacecraft de-
sign. Decisions must be made about what will be imple-
mented as automatic recovery capabilities, what will be
initiated by on-board logic, and what will be initiated by
ground command if nonstandard or failure mode condi-
tions exist on the spacecraft The use of ground commands
is a recognized means of activating redundant elements
when a delay in the transmission'of the command can be
tolerated without danger to the life of the spacecraft
Ground command reaction to spacecraft anomalies is not
instantly available during the mission operations phase
for a variety of reasons, not the least of which is the two-
way communication time delay Mars missions have ap-
proximately 25-min round-trip delays, on the basis of
140,000,000-rm communication ranges. Of primary im-
portance is whether the spacecraft will cease to operate
before the ground command can be transmitted to the
spacecraft. On-board logic must therefore be employed
to activate redundant elements when command delays
could endanger the life of the spacecraft
The design of the spacecraft is also influenced by the
requirement to perform certain test and assembly opera-
tions on the spacecraft Although functional capabilities
of subsystem designs usually consist of statements describ-
ing what the subsystem should do in flight, there must
also be capabilities to tolerate certain conditions on the
ground Examples of the latter are:
1 No operations requiring physical access to the space-
craft are permitted while in the launch complex This
indicates that sensors whose field-of-view require-
ments vary with date of launch must be designed to
be operable with a fixed field of view over the entire
launch penod
2 No services of liquid or gaseous umbihcals will be
available to the propulsion subsystem This dictates
that the propulsion subsystem must be fueled and
pressurized before going to the launch complex For
spacecraft safety considerations, the propulsion sub-
system must be removable for the fueling and pres-
surizing operation
Automatic unmanned planetary spacecraft designs must
incorporate capabilities which permit mission objective
achievement, even under some degraded modes of opera-
tion Identification of the minimum functional capabilities
to achieve the mission objectives is accomplished assum-
ing no failures aboard the spacecraft Subsequently, fail-
ure modes and degraded operational modes are examined
to identify capabilities which should exist to permit sur-
vival and mission accomplishment despite these non-
standard conditions. Sufficient capability should exist to
permit at least two independent means of initiating
critical, discrete functions and to provide redundant, or
alternate, modes of operation for all critical continuous
functions Reference 1 discusses a technique, failure
mode effect analysis, for assuring that these conditions
are satisfied
A consideration in this effort of defining the required
functional capabilities is the necessity for design trade-
offs As more and more becomes known of the system de-
sign there is increased recognition that all desired capabil-
ities or functions cannot be implemented, and that design
compromises must be accepted The role of the system
designer in this activity is to precipitate the various argu-
ments involved with recognized problems and decide
which functions should be implemented
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III. EXAMPLE: SYSTEM DESIGN ACTIVITY
The encounter phase of the 1964 Manner Mars space-
craft flight sequence is a good example of the system de-
sign activity necessary to define the required functional
capabilities This example illustrates the need to examine
a multitude of interactions to ensure total spacecraft
capability for fulfilling the primary mission objective
A consideration of the mission objectives and Project
Office definition of mission value clearly showed that
every effort had to be expended to achieve successful tele-
vision pictures of the planet. The design concept which
resulted can be summarized in several statements
1 A vidicon sensor with appropriate optics takes the
television pictures
2 A magnetic tape recorder stores the data readout
from the television subsystem
3 A scanning mechanism orients the television sub-
system toward the planet
4 A specialized sequencer controls the acquisition and
recording of the television picture data
5 All encounter-oriented equipment is de-energized
during the transit from Earth to Mars
This basic concept had to be translated into specific re-
quirements for functional capabilities affecting nearly
every spacecraft subsystem
A question which anses when one considers an auto-
matic spacecraft, is how and when the encounter sequence
should be initiated An acknowledgment of the philoso-
phy which requires two independent means of initiating
critical events (one of which is on-board to permit the
spacecraft to be automatic) led to the selection of a
central computer and sequencer (CC&S) signal and a
ground command to initiate the encounter sequence This
sequence was to activate the planetary (planet-related)
equipment, cause the television subsystem to be oriented
toward the planet, initiate and control the recording of
data, and turn off the planetary equipment
The tune of the encounter sequence start was bounded
by the desire not to energize the planetary equipment
after passing the planet and by the desire not to energize
this equipment so early that television shutter mechanism
failure or scan platform actuator failure would occur
before the television subsystem observed the planet A
time was selected for this sequence which placed the
spacecraft as close to the planet as possible, consistent
with the uncertainties which existed about when the
closest approach to the plant would occur Because the
CC&S has event times with only a 3%-hr resolution from
its master timer, the ability to select the time of the CC&S
sequence initiation is limited to ± 1% hr The 3-sigma
trajectory dispersions contribute about a 2%-hr uncer-
tainty. An additional 36-min uncertainty exists due to the
0.01% allowable drift in the CC&S clock This total un-
certainty of when the CC&S would initiate the sequence,
relative to closest approach is 4^ hr Acknowledging that
the television pictures could be taken 25 mm before clos-
est approach on some trajectories, the initiation of the
sequence should be at least 5 hr before nominal closest
approach to the planet Consideration must also be given
to the fact that the scan subsystem must orient the plat-
form toward the planet, and this too requires time. Some
allowance must be made also for sending backup com-
mands in case of failure of the automatic features. The
nominal time selected for initiating the encounter se-
quence was 6% hr before closest approach
The time for automatically de-energizing the planetary
equipment had to be long enough after closest approach
that worst-case early tolerances would not cause initiation
and cessation of the encounter sequence before the ac-
quisition of the encounter sequence Owing to the 3%-hr
CC&S timing resolution, 13% hr was selected as the inter-
val between starting and stopping the encounter sequence
The magnitude of these uncertainties in spacecraft tim-
ing and trajectory dispersions illustrates why television
picture recording cannot be initiated by a preprogrammed
clock The recording sequence can only be about 25 min
to allow pictures to be taken across a major diameter of
the planet, therefore, a recording sequence of excessive
length would complicate the design and increase the play-
back time
The sequence was to be initiated only when the tele-
vision was looking at some portion of the planet Since
preprogramming was not effective in providing an on-
board recording sequence initiation capability, other
means of achieving this result had to be found Thus two,
on-board, independent, redundant means of initiating the
sequence were provided
The television itself provided one means of sensing
the planet The design of the television subsystem was such
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that it took pictures whenever it was on, not knowing
when the data were being recorded Internal logic exam-
ined the intensity of the signals being sensed and, when
a preset threshold level was surpassed, the television sub-
system would indicate to the data automation subsystem
that the recording should commence The backup for
initiating the recording sequence was a cadmium sulfide
detector with a narrow field of view pointed parallel to
the TV Whenever the planet entered the field of view
of this detector the recording sequence would be initiated
This rather simple device replaced a more complicated
sensing circuit intially incorporated into the ultraviolet
(UV) photometer instrument The realization that the
desired redundancy was being provided by two non-
simple logic circuits that were not required by the UV
instrument in its mechanism resulted in the design change
to employ the cadmium sulfide detector In this manner
the required functional capability of the UV instrument
was reduced In addition to the initiation of the recording
by the above techniques, a ground command backup was
employed because of the cnticahty of the function
An important aspect of the system designer's activity is
to protect the system against failure modes The effort to
prevent a loss of data already recorded on the tape repre-
sented an area of major concern A two-track endless-loop
tape recorder, started and stopped for each picture, was
employed for recording the television data Should the
recorder not be stopped when the two tracks were filled
with data, the first data recorded would be obliterated
The acquisition of a limb picture was very desirable Since
this would be the first picture, special precautions were
taken to ensure that these data would not be lost The
tape recorder design was required to provide a counting
circuit which sensed the number of tracks of data re-
corded and stopped recording when the record track had
been filled Backups to this circuit were two signals gen-
erated internally to the data automation system (DAS)
which inhibited further "start record" commands to the
tape recorder
The examples given of the system designer's problems
are comparable to many other problems which must be
solved to generate an optimum spacecraft design Only
through the process of answenng questions similar to
What is being done to prevent the loss of previously re-
corded data? is the design adequately reviewed and the
necessary requirements for subsystem and system func-
tional capability recognized
IV. SUMMARY
The system design aspect of Spacecraft System engi-
neering is chiefly a technical discipline concerned with
the spacecraft as an entity composed of many interacting
elements (subsystems) Only when the design is viewed as
a whole is there sufficient opportunity to identify the
interfaces to permit an optimal design to be fabricated
A significant amount of feedback in the system design
process is required to permit the various phases of the
design to be concluded Since consideration of the entire
spacecraft is the most significant aspect of the systems
design function, the more complex spacecraft of the future
will be an increasingly difficult and challenging problem
for the system designer This increased complexity may
necessitate computerizing the design process.
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